12 November 2024: New Islamist Armed Group, Lakurawas, Emerges in Nigeria

Executive summary

● On 8 November, the Nigerian armed forces announced the formation of a new armed Islamist group called the Lakurawas.

● Having allegedly come from Niger and Mali, the group is reportedly operating in at least five Local Government Areas of Sokoto State and carried out an attack in Kebbi State.

● The remote and difficult terrain of the porous border region between Nigeria and Niger makes an ideal area of operations for the group.

Context

On 7 November, Nigerian defence officials announced the formation of a new armed Islamist group called the Lakurawas, which had been operating in North Western Nigeria in the states of Kebbi and Sokoto. The army said that the influx of Lakurawas is linked to the July 2023 coup in Niger, which disrupted joint military patrols along the border between Nigeria and Niger. It seems the group has not yet carried out a major attack, but news reports state that the group has collected cows from locals in exchange for "protection." This is a common financing and intimidation tactic employed by extremist groups to control locals in their areas of operation. The group carried out an attack in Mera town in the Augie Local Government Area of Kebbi State on 8 November, killing at least fifteen people as residents were preparing for Jumaat prayers. The attackers reportedly also rustled at least 100 cattle as part of the attack.

It is not the first time a group named “Lakurawas” has been reported active in the area. According to a report by Hudson from as early as 5 April 2023, in October 2018, jihadists, likely affiliated with the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS), crossed the border from the Niger Republic into the communities of Tangaza and Gudu in Sokoto state, Nigeria. Known locally as "Lakurawa" (a Hausa-isation of the French for “the recruits”), they were initially welcomed by locals seeking help against bandits from neighbouring Zamfara state. However, their welcome quickly soured as the militants imposed harsh religious penalties under Sharia Law, such as prohibiting activities like dancing, and levied Islamic taxes (Zakat) on Fulani pastoralists, further inflaming regional tensions. Within months, a joint Nigerian-Nigerien military operation pushed the jihadists back across the border, relieving the affected communities. It should be noted, though, that Major General Edward Buba, the defence spokesperson, said that this is the first attempt of the Sahelian jihadists to create a foothold in Nigeria and that they had been kept at bay until now thanks to joint cross-border operations with the Republic of Niger.

Analysis

This development highlights the ongoing security crisis in Nigeria, which traces back to the Boko Haram (Jama'at Ahl al-Sunnah li-Da'wah wa'l-Jihad (JAS)) insurgency. The Boko Haram insurgency has traditionally been centred in northeastern Nigeria, particularly in Borno state, as well as parts of neighbouring Cameroon, Chad, and Niger, collectively known as the Lake Chad Basin. In recent years, however, jihadist groups have expanded into the northwest of Nigeria. Despite this expansion, jihadists are not the primary security threat in the northwest - instead, the region is grappling with a complex mix of criminal insurgency, kidnap-for-ransom, and inter-communal violence, commonly referred to as "banditry."

Jihadist factions such as ISWAP have made repeated attempts to recruit from the region’s bandit groups. However, these efforts have largely failed due to ideological differences, a lack of political-economic alignment, and the autonomy of the bandits. Despite these challenges, jihadists have managed to establish enclaves in the northwest and have cooperated with bandits for specific high-profile attacks, such as the 2022 Abuja-Kaduna train hijacking and the Kuje Prison attack. While jihadists remain secondary players in the region, their ability to conduct significant attacks poses a growing threat to security in the northwest.

Forecast

This development is almost certainly a signal of the beginning of a new phase of instability in Nigeria's northwest, where banditry has already complicated the security situation. Given the group's early attempts to establish a foothold in the region, attacks are likely to increase in the coming weeks. Local communities, already strained by ongoing violence, will likely find themselves caught in the crossfire as the armed forces attempt to secure the region. The Nigerian military's ability to respond to this new threat will almost certainly be crucial in determining whether the northwest becomes another hotspot for Islamist insurgency, further complicating the country's security challenges.

Publication Link: https://www.linkedin.com/posts/global-weekly_special-update-briefing-lakurawas-in-activity-7261981064493940737-CrXg?utm_source=share&utm_medium=member_ios

30 October 2024: Gun violence in South Africa continues to rise; Lusikisiki shootings represent nationwide crisis

Executive Summary

● 18 people have died after two mass shootings in Lusikisiki in South Africa’s Eastern Cape Province.

● The shootings have brought to light the growing levels of gun violence and the escalating gang warfare within the nation.

● Despite efforts to clamp down on criminal activities, South Africa's continued struggle with violent crime, economic disparities and law enforcement challenges will likely heighten public and media scrutiny of the government.

Context

On 28 September 2024, Lusikisiki, a small rural town in South Africa’s Eastern Cape province, saw two mass shootings that left a combined 18 people dead, including 15 women. The killings occurred on the outskirts of the town, and six people have been arrested for the attack. Lusikisiki faces deep socio-economic challenges, including high levels of poverty and unemployment. These challenges, combined with the country’s high murder rate - 45 homicides per 100,000 people – have fuelled a surge in gun violence. Despite strict firearm laws, illegal, unregistered guns are widespread.

Analysis

This incident exemplifies the growing gun violence that has plagued South Africa for decades, exacerbated by high unemployment, poverty and insufficient policing in certain communities. The links between gang activity, poverty and violent crime are clear, and the Lusikisiki shootings are likely connected to these broader issues. Gang violence in South Africa is often driven by the struggle for dominance in the illicit drug trade and control over territory, with innocent civilians frequently caught in the crossfire. Despite the country’s efforts to reduce gang violence, law enforcement is often ill-equipped or unable to address the deep-rooted causes of criminality. The shootings also underscore the need for a more coordinated approach to public safety, such as collaborating with the private sector. While police forces in South Africa have made efforts to target gang and organised crime leaders, many communities remain under the influence of these actors, who exert control over residents through fear and intimidation. Compounding these concerns is the lack of trust in law enforcement, with many residents unwilling to cooperate with authorities due to fear of retribution from gangs and other actors. Therefore, this incident has highlighted systemic failures, including the under-resourced nature of policing in vulnerable areas alongside outdated policing strategies.

Forecast

In the wake of these shootings, there will likely be increased calls for action from civil society and political leaders to take stronger measures against violent crime and improve community policing efforts. In the short term, the government is expected to increase police patrols and implement targeted measures such as community mobilisation and stop-and-search operations to combat gang violence. Similar incidents are likely to continue unless systemic issues are addressed, further fuelling instability in South Africa's already strained communities. Additionally, the government's response to this crisis will likely be subject to heightened public and media scrutiny, and any delays or inadequacies in addressing these issues could erode public trust even further.

Publication Link: https://www.global-weekly.com/post/sub-saharan-africa-intelligence-report-6-30-10-2024

22 October 2024: Türkiye’s influence in Somalia; cooperation likely to grow

Executive Summary

●Somalia has become a key strategic area for Türkiye’s expansion in the region.

●With more than one thousand Turkish troops on the ground and Turkish drones operating against Al-Shabaab, Ankara seeks to solidify its presence in the country.

● Given Somalia’s strategic location near the Gulf of Aden, Türkiye plans to establish a naval presence on the coast and set up a space rocket launchpad within the country.

Context

Somalia's strategic significance has attracted various international players, with Türkiye emerging as a critical partner in the region. Over the past decade, Türkiye has deepened its military and economic ties with Somalia, establishing a significant presence that includes the deployment of troops and advanced drones to combat the militant group Al-Shabaab. This military collaboration is not only aimed at enhancing Somalia's security but also at stabilising a region plagued by conflict and piracy. Türkiye's ambitions extend beyond military involvement; the country is also looking to secure its interests in the Gulf of Aden, a vital shipping route. Plans to establish a naval base along Somalia's coast and set up a space rocket launchpad highlight Ankara's commitment to expanding its influence. This strategic engagement in Somalia is part of Türkiye’s broader vision to strengthen its role in Africa and counterbalance other powers in the region, ultimately shaping the geopolitical landscape of the continent.

Analysis

Türkiye’s growing influence in Somalia reflects a smart strategy that blends military support with economic interests and geopolitical goals. By deploying troops and using drones to target Al-Shabaab, Türkiye has positioned itself as a key ally for a nation that’s long struggled with insecurity. This military backing not only helps Somalia combat terrorism but also cements Türkiye’s role in the Horn of Africa, a region where stability is crucial for trade and security. Furthermore, Türkiye’s plans for a naval base and a space rocket launchpad signal a serious commitment to the region. The naval base would help secure vital maritime routes and could serve as a counterbalance to other regional powers like Iran and Saudi Arabia, which also have interests in the area. Interestingly, Türkiye’s engagement goes beyond just military actions; it includes economic investments and infrastructure projects aimed at building goodwill and local capacity, such as the Somalia Recep Tayyip Erdoğan Hospital. This holistic approach strengthens ties and positions Türkiyeas as a positive force in a region often overlooked by traditional powers.

Forecast

Looking ahead, Türkiye's influence in Somalia will likely grow, driven by its military presence and ambitious infrastructure projects. As Ankara strengthens its ties, we may see increased stability in the region, potentially diminishing the threat from Al-Shabaab. However, this expansion could provoke reactions from regional powers such as Kenya and Tanzania, leading to heightened geopolitical tensions in East Africa. If Türkiye successfully establishes its naval base and rocket launchpad, it may solidify its role as a key player in securing maritime routes, further altering regional power dynamics.

Publication Link: https://www.global-weekly.com/post/mena-intelligence-report-5-22-10-2024